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CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL LIBRARIES

Final Report

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by

Herbert Luger

Ronald Booser

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U. S. Army Materials Research Agency

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CONTROL DATA CORPORATION

Howard Research Division

Bethesda, Maryland

## ABSTRACT

A survey of the literature in the last ten years and interviews with library and security personnel indicated:

- (1) The problems of handling classified information in libraries have been scantied.
- (2) There is wide divergence in policies and practices of disseminating such materials.
- (3) Interlibrary cooperation with respect to classified holdings is reduced to minimum compliance with administrative or contractual obligations.
- (4) Technical intelligence is perhaps artificially divorced from technical information suitable for dissemination within the military - industrial community.

Following a critical analysis of survey findings, recommendations for action and further studies are presented.

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## PREFACE

The draft version of this report included a section entitled "Security and Information Handling". This section examined the history of the security classification system, presented security fundamentals in relation to technical library services, indicating problem areas and probable developments, and explored the difference between technical intelligence and technical information. In the interest of brevity, the section has been deleted from this final report at the special request of the technical monitor for possible separate issue as a working paper.

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## SECTION I

### INTRODUCTION

#### A. Context of the Study

##### 1. ATLIS and STINFO

As a part of the ATLIS (Army Technical Library Improvement Studies) Program, the present study straddles 3 of 4 task areas, namely Management and Technical Direction, specifically "technical library problems identification" (01/001); Library Operations, more or less across the board; and Library Services, in particular "initial distribution of technical publications" (03/001) but more especially "library use of classified technical documents" (03/007). To quote the latter: "This work unit will review current techniques for internal circulation and servicing of classified and restricted of technical documents, and determine feasible methods for maximum abstracting and circulation of classified technical material with security concepts". (Department of the Army; Office, Chief of Engineers. Army Technical Library Improvement Studies (ATLIS). n.d.)

It will be noted that this is not yet another unfocused problem. Security classification impedes dissemination because it is poorly understood. The proof is manifold: (1) the issue of reconciling the "right to know" with the "need to know" based on "national defense", "national security" or "national interest" is no nearer resolution today than twenty years ago, despite endless hearings and discussions; (2) information relating to unclassified research is not beyond the reach of the security program; (3) not only the Department of Defense, but Executive departments and agencies, are empowered to prescribe classification and security requirements which are not fully coordinated; (4) there is a growing volume of limited distribution materials.

An historical review shows that the phenomenon of classified information in peacetime within a democracy is a fairly recent event, although commonplace within dictatorships. It is a creature of history, born under extremely urgent circumstances and developed during very unsettled and unsettling

times. It will thus be apparent that the confrontation of the maze of laws and regulations governing the handling of security-affected materials outside a political frame of reference is unrewarding when not discouraging. In a positive vein, we will say to the information middlemen that an informed view of security will greatly speed the flow of information to a "needful" clientele.

This is the burden of the STINFO program, as it impinges on this study. The Crawford Task Force ("Scientific and Technological Communication in the Government", April 1962) reported:

"A very significant portion of Government-sponsored STINFO is subject to security classification restrictions. We are fully aware that the problems concerning national security policy are very complex; however, we wish to stress the need for improved interpretation and application of these policies so the effective and essential STINFO communication may be achieved, consistent with valid security requirements. The basic weakness of this (need-to-know) concept is that frequently individuals needing information do not know of its existence and therefore cannot ask for it. We believe that better means are needed and feasible for announcing the existence of STINFO without compromising security."

The Humphrey Subcommittee on Government Reorganization and International Organization added another dimension by implicating limited distribution materials:

"The need to know as a restriction of the dissemination of non-classified information should be reviewed with the objective of achieving the most widespread dissemination of information consistent with security and of achieving uniform practices and elimination of unnecessary red tape."  
(Appendix A, Ibid)

## 2. Interface with National Information Services

The STINFO program envisages utilization of the vast uncoordinated information resources throughout the nation. DOD Directive 5100.36 states (IV. Policy):

"A. To ensure timely, effective and efficient conduct of its missions, DOD will pursue vigorous, well-organized, thoroughly coordinated, comprehensive technical information programs. These programs will provide for the interchange of



technical information within DOD, between DOD and its contractors, and other Federal agencies and their contractors, and between DOD and the scientific and technical community to the maximum extent permitted by security."

DOD Directive 5100.38 provided an expanded mission for the Defense Documentation Center. Again (Section IV. Objectives) it states:

"The timely, effective and efficient bibliographic processing, announcement, and secondary distribution of DOD technical reports is a basic and integral part of the DOD Scientific and Technical Information Program. To ensure the interchange of DOD technical reports to the maximum extent permitted by security and other recognized controlling statements, the operation of DDC shall be designed and conducted to obtain the following objective in documentation services."

It goes without saying DDC is a principal resource for the defense community.

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.) provides (Section 303):

"Information obtained or developed by the Administrator in the performance of his functions under this Act shall be made available for public inspection except (A) information classified to protect the national security."

On the other hand, the Atomic Energy Commission, governed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 as amended by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), has a category of information which is "born classified", namely Restricted Data defined as follows (42 U.S.C. 2014):

"All data concerning (1) design, manufacture and utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy; but shall not include data declassified or removed from the restricted data category pursuant to Section 142."

The Atomic Energy Commission is also charged with the dissemination of scientific and technical information. To accomplish this mission it has an active review program to facilitate declassification, and an Access Permit program covered by Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 25 "Permits for Access to Restricted Data" and 10 CFR 95 "Safeguarding of Restricted Data."

All three agencies render multiple services in the area of dissemination, whether related to current awareness (announcement media, abstract bulletins) or retrospective requirements (special and running bibliographies) or distribution (primary or secondary).

### 3. The Industrial Security Complex

Since the bulk of RDT&E is performed through contract with industry and the academic community--the "arsenal" organization of the defense effort has been in relatively uninterrupted decline since World War I--the industrial community as consumer and producer of classified STINFO is a primary concern of that program. The relationship is very fertile one for cooperative efforts, because industry--and we include the academic world in so far as it performs defense connected R&D--takes far from a passive role in the collection, analysis and dissemination of information. Recognition of the crucial role played by industry is shown by the Weinberg report's plumping for information centers as the wave of future. This conclusion is embodied in DOD Instruction 5100.45 "Centers for Analysis of Scientific and Technical Information", which distinguishes them from documentation centers and libraries, whose functions are primarily concerned with the handling of documents rather than the technical information contained in the documents.

"Information analysis centers" it goes on to say, "usually will be adjuncts to organizations engaged in technical work, and normally will be assigned information analysis responsibility in all or part of the subject-matter field in which the host organization specializes. It is contemplated that a substantial part of the information analysis work of the

centers will be performed by personnel of the host organization in extension of and in conjunction with their regular scientific work."

It need only be added that NASA's Scientific and Technical Information Facility is operated by a contractor.

## B. Conduct of the Study

### 1. Literature Survey

The emphasis of the survey was on problems restricting or impeding the flow of classified or limited distribution materials and solutions which would provide a dynamic intelligence service for the scientist-technologist with a need-to-know. Hence, unless a document specifically took note of the classification issue, it was deemed--and proved--unresponsive. Thus, if a particular technique was equally applicable to unclassified and classified materials without qualification--for example, an undifferentiated treatment of profile construction and maintenance in an SDI system--it was not relevant, since the core problem revolved about coping with the limitations imposed by classification. Inferentially the premise on which such a treatment is based is that no problem exists, if the collection consists wholly of open literature, or that the problem is trivial. As the investigation of operating systems demonstrated, there were many problems.

Since the problems were a consequence of classification or other security considerations, it was essential to examine the bases of the security classification programs. It was not--and is not now--intended that the material presented is an authoritative guide to security law. That is the responsibility of departments and agencies. The literature survey was conducted along four lines: (1) background readings on the origin, development and conditions underlying security (2) identification of the principal applicable legal administrative documents; (3) readings which might establish a

distinction between "technical intelligence" and "technical information", if feasible; (4) literature, classified or unclassified, on the handling of classified material, whose central theme is abstracting or extracting lending itself to unclassified distribution or, alternatively, declassification actions. Needless to say the time span allotted to the overall task precluded an exhaustive search; duplication and reduplication of existing compilations was sedulously avoided; and an attempt was made to assimilate the materials instead of multiplying citations. Thus, the bibliography is selective.

A few other remarks are pertinent. As Helen Redman found ("Report Number Chaos," Special Libraries, 53, no. 10 (Dec. 1962): 574-78), the references to the handling of classified literature were very sparse. The usual search tools (Library Literature, Library Abstracts, Documentation Abstracts) were practically unavailing. This was attributable as much to shallow indexing as to the scant attention paid to the subject. (We shall have more to say about this in Section II.) A request bibliography furnished by DDC, which consisted of several hundred items, dealt more with hierarchical classification than with security but did, in fact, include items on classification in the desired sense. Screening reduced the latter to some 45 items, which upon examination dwindled to a mere handful. (It must be recorded that DDC's indexing in many cases revealed close analysis of the document, since the main topics of the document under examination were often quite distant.) Bibliographies were combed, screened and entries eliminated by scanning. Authorities queried on the subject were sympathetic but not productive. In Section III we will consider the import of this seeming unavailability of the literature.

## 2. Library-Information Facility Survey

The most rewarding phase of the project was, not unexpectedly, the library-information facility survey. In accordance with ATLAS and STINFO philosophy, the facilities visited were either defense installations, non-profits or national dissemination centers. While a broader spectrum

and a more representative cross-section of the STINFO community would have been desirable, the present study had a very modest goal, namely to ascertain what problems existed in the area of classified information dissemination and to suggest such further studies as appeared warranted, in addition to recommending useful practices or providing guidance for library personnel.

It was realized at the outset that this aspect of library economy was a sensitive one: there is still a lingering fear of getting involved in a security imbroglio. Moreover, there appears to be a good deal of resentment at the burdens imposed by the mechanics of handling classified materials. When budgets are tight, the additional expense connected with these materials cuts into available funds for other vital services. Then, too, there is uncertainty as to what may or may not be disclosed. Accordingly, it was decided that the survey would be conducted in an informal manner; would not be normative, certainly not critical; would invite opinion as well as fact; would encompass present activities, as well as plans and long range goals.

A letter giving a capsule summary of study objectives and assurances to this effect was sent to facilities within a proposed itinerary which sought to eliminate geographical bias. This was followed up by telephone conversations to ascertain whether the respondent thought a visit would be productive. Pertinent criteria would be the extent to which the organization engaged in classified programs and how actively it disseminated classified information. Thus, for example, on the first count Arthur D. Little of Cambridge was excluded. The Library of Congress was eliminated on the second count. NASA indicated that its mission was essentially unclassified; that the small amount of classified material announced in C-STAR-- and then only if the title and/or abstract can be limited to Confidential--was mainly from other agencies. Moreover, an invitation was wholly the prerogative of the host facility.

An effort was made to make the interviews active rather than passive, a dialogue instead of a one-sided question-and-answer routine, to encourage easy communication. The sponsor

and contractor were frequently both present at these sessions. An interesting feature was the participation of security officers at most of the meetings: in some instances they had responsibility for classified materials which bypassed the library. The formal conduct of the interview was limited to covering items on a checklist and collecting relevant documentation where these were releasable.

In midcourse the scope of the individual surveys was contracted to eliminate background data and mechanics of processing in order to focus on dissemination practices. The thought had been that it might be possible to establish significant correlations with such items, for example, as whether a library just grew or was planned; whether it was science or technology oriented; whether the staff was computer-minded or traditional. However, such details were not only time-consuming, they also plowed in the same furrows as previous surveys, albeit for a different purpose. Nevertheless, even with a small sample, it was possible to discern meaningful relationships.

Where it was not possible to arrange a visit, it was often possible to obtain essential unclassified information in a telephone conversation or correspondence. In one case, an interview was conducted during a supper preceding an ATLIS workshop and resumed elsewhere. In sum, cooperation was generally excellent.

## SECTION II

### ANALYSIS OF SURVEY FINDINGS

#### A. Viewpoints on Acquisition

It would be reasonable to expect that even an ambitious program of acquisition of classified documents would be hampered by security controls. Obviously one cannot accumulate materials against a contingent and future need to know. Moreover, security requirements militate against collecting information of limited utility: the costs and responsibilities entailed are too great. On the other hand, insofar as classification is based on advanced developments, there would appear to be ample motivation for an aggressive policy of acquisition.

In one instance only was there an all-out program in effect. The very mission of this service organization depended on a current, exhaustive collection of pertinent materials, classified and unclassified. Naturally there was a concomitant problem of screening. Only 25% of the materials were acceptable for further analysis.

The reactions ranged from a conviction that the classified report literature was of dubious value for scientific purposes, although it had utility for such validated engineering data as it might contain, to assertions that, between original distribution, fulfillment of staff requests, and secondary distribution sources, the spectrum of available information was pretty well covered. Informal sources also played a role: word-of-mouth, staff suggestions, citations, visits to other facilities, attendance at conferences and symposia. Reliance on the major announcement vehicles, TAB, C-STAR, ACR, was common. Another prominent source were the special bibliographies prepared by DDC. These were regarded as a mixed blessing: they appeared to contain a great deal of irrelevant material. However, refinement of the request in terms of more specific descriptors usually succeeded in improving the response.

There was unanimous agreement that controlled or limited distribution materials presented the most troublesome aspect of acquisition. The justification normally required for release was difficult to satisfy. If military liaison intervened, matters were considerably expedited.

B. Bibliographic Control

Top Secret and sensitive materials usually bypassed the library completely. In two instances, librarians were custodians of Top Secret documents. In neither case was bibliographic control attempted: logging was for purposes of identification and security control. One organization with a substantial volume of such materials followed a mixed policy: the logging sheets recorded a rather full description of the documents. Some of these reports were subjected to extensive analysis: these were occasionally represented in the catalog.

In most cases, card catalogs were maintained. Bibliographic descriptions were usually full, including document numbers, report series, project numbers, and user agency. Subject headings or descriptors were normally present. In only two instances were these ignored. However, the case was different for annotations and abstracts: only one library included these on the catalog card. The extracts, abstracts or annotations were often carried on the cataloging worksheet or in the analyst's personal files.

Processing was more often manual than mechanized. Only one computer-produced book catalog was in actual use; another was between systems; one was expected in the near future, if funds became available; two were in the planning stage.

Access was solely by corporate author in some cases. The majority of catalogs could be approached by most of the elements of description, except personal authors. Accession numbers were freely employed as an aid to arrangement for retrieval, shelf-listing, and chronology. However, reports were often maintained in series. In one such instance, access was afforded through the standard associated index-abstract tools rather than a catalog.



## C. Dissemination

### 1. Abstracting, Extracting, Indexing and Analytic Activities and Services

Abstracting and extracting activities were minimal in processing classified reports. This is undoubtedly advantageous for reducing input costs, when the material - as happens too often to be the case - is not expected to get much circulation or use. There is also considerable opinion to the effect that certain elements of information in the bibliographic description are sufficient to clue technical staff regarding the potential usefulness of a report: corporate author, title, project information, personal author whose previous work is well known. Indexing, unless highly specific and in depth, may be too generalized for such a determination. One of the considerations that influences libraries to "do without" is the availability of such index-abstract publications as TAB, C-STAR, and AEC's ACR. The operative reasons are: lack of budget and staff; derivative classification of the product and security control of the distribution.

The classic example of an unclassified bibliographic tool containing both extensive indexing and abstracts of classified documents through Secret is, of course, TAB. The decision to go this route - widely admired by its large audience as well as other agencies who do not follow its example - was prompted by the tremendous administrative problems in preparing and disseminating a classified abstract bulletin, not to mention the resultant problems to the recipient. The object was to provide a tool for use, not one honored by the dust of disuse. The solution was to suppress classified details. Naturally, this requires analysts with subject expertise, lots of exposure to and experience in processing classified materials, and authoritative guidance all the way. It is a workable program. The only limitation placed on TAB is that it must be protected against unauthorized access.

An analysis in depth, embracing intensive indexing, abstracts, extracts, cross-references, etc. might be made to serve as a substitute for the original document in most cases. One organization employed special analysts for critical materials, who worked closely with the

cataloger-indexer. They not only made extensive annotations and extracts, but checked the accuracy of factual details, a type of technical proofreading, as it were. Where the matter couldn't be resolved by reference materials or resort to local authorities, the authors were contacted for confirmation, and were only too happy to correct the errors or provide clarification. Another feature of the same operation was feedback from the technical staff. This was incorporated in the form of annotations, abstracts, extracts and evaluations in the original cataloging sheets and as additions to or corrections of indexing in the card catalog. Feedback in connection with editing or revision of subject entries was encountered in most organizations enjoying good staff relationships and active patronage. In yet another operation, the abstracts and extracts formed a part of the individual analysts' files, but were available to qualified personnel. In neither case, however, was there an attempt to purge them of classified references. But shorter, unclassified annotations did show up in selected bibliographies and searches. The single formal abstract-index bulletin contained both classified and unclassified material and consequently had a limited distribution.

Depth of indexing depended upon a multiplicity of factors. Most facilities indicated that they made no distinction between classified and unclassified materials in this regard. On the other hand, where the parent organization's mission was highly specialized, analysis was invariably intensive for "hot" topics. In one case, color coding was employed to signal these in the card catalog. Items which had received preliminary cataloging so that the materials could be released promptly to the intended recipient were given full treatment when returned to the library for retention, and, of course, enjoyed the benefit of the technical staff's evaluation. In most cases, the items were screened before processing: those which were not discarded were indexed in greater or lesser depth according to the subject area's centrality to the organization's disciplinary or mission profile. If peripheral subjects which had been absent from the literature showed signs of prominence

in current receipts, they were closely observed for indications of a significant trend and possible upgrading. Internally generated publications, which pulled together a great deal of diffuse documentation, were usually accorded the closest scrutiny and analyzed at greatest depth. However, citations of the documents were watched for increasing or waning interest, still another criterion for grading the subject's importance. These are some of the rational elements of decision for depth of indexing and other analysis.

As usual, there were practical reasons for the disparities in analytic treatment. In two cases, no subject indexing or other form of routine analysis was undertaken as a result of the decision, in the first instance, to rely on available indexes, and, in the second, on the strength of the fact that the bibliographic description contained all the information that a patron would normally require without resorting to an analyst's store of knowledge. In other cases, there was a mounting backlog that had to be controlled. Far and away the decisive reason was lack of staff, either in quantity or quality, for the job on hand. Where funds were available, the job was contracted out. Another reason was the limitation of the technology employed. In manual systems, compromises are usual in the number of terms used to qualify a document: more terms make for a bulky file. In only one case, other than aforementioned, was there an arbitrary decision to eschew depth indexing. As pointed out above, if the demands on the indexing apparatus for retrieval purposes are relatively few, then uniform processing of all materials becomes an expensive form of self-indulgence or a mindless activity, bibliomania in the pejorative sense. As we have also seen, there are many who deplore the usual technical report as a type of uncritical writing at best, or as perfunctory documentation of questionable R&D at worst.

An obvious question is why not take advantage of the available bibliographic and analytical tools such as TAB, STAR and NSA or their classified versions? Still another question along the same line is why not use source cataloging, indexing

and abstracting now increasingly available with reports on original distribution? The answers, while somewhat variable, were mainly to the effect that: (1) secondary publications such as TAB lagged original publication by too great a time interval to be useful; (2) the descriptors and abstracts of classified documents were much too general to be serviceable; (3) the basic indexing terminology was inadequate for organizations that catered to specialized R&D groups; (4) the analytical slant was at variance with local requirements; (5) bibliographical compatibility was lacking because standardization of content and format had not been practiced in the past and was not yet accomplished.

In reference to DD 1473 other conditions prevail. There is, of course, the authority of the producer of the report behind the abstract and the characterization of the content by descriptors. This could, indeed, pave the way for a set of unclassified listings for wider internal dissemination unencumbered by strict security controls, since the requirement is that the informational elements are to be kept unclassified to the extent that this is at all feasible. The answers were very much in kind. In the first place, there had not been much conformity with the reporting requirements, so there was not much experience with the product on which to form a judgment; there were already indications that the preparation of the DD 1473 did not scrupulously comply with instructions; often it was treated as just another administrative obligation; with the exception of timeliness, all the other objections to a general index-abstract service applied, namely, despite the author's perception of the import of the report, its use by the recipient organization usually involved some transformation of the information. Nevertheless, there was agreement that these devices had potential usefulness as a check on and possible supplement to routine processing.

## 2. Announcement Media

(a) Accessions lists. This was the universal announcement medium. Frequency was most commonly weekly, in some cases biweekly, and, in the case of a classified bulletin, monthly.

All announced both classified and unclassified documents, but kept the bulletin unclassified by suppressing classified titles or other classified indicia. One bulletin ignored classified items, but only because the volume was very small and security restrictions exigent. Almost all were confined to internal use, only one instance being recorded where they were on routine external distribution. Most were available for the asking; some available only to departments, projects, laboratories, where presumably they would filter down to interested staff members.

Their content, format and arrangement varied greatly. Some were little more than title listings; while others were replicas of catalog cards with only the analytical entries purged. Still others included miscellanea, such as: library announcements; "house" news; contract awards, new programs, achievements and publications; highlights of related external technology; information activities and resources. One elaborate bulletin reproduced current contents pages of periodicals, and presented full details on calls for papers, forthcoming conferences, symposia, workshops and meetings pertinent to mission and staff interests. Internal publications were announced along with accessions, but usually apart from the other listings.

Some were machine printouts. Two were printed on perforated stock for personal file appropriation. Arrangements were by corporate author or accession number generally. In either case, these could be ordered by a table of contents, general subject divisions, full indexing or any combination of these. Almost all were accompanied by a requisition or order slip listing accession or call numbers for immediate routing or reserve listing.

The usefulness of accessions lists seems almost never to have been called into question. Certainly a library patron likes to be assured that the collection is current and comprehensive. One library stated flatly that it did not regard the accessions list as a reference or retrieval tool, although conceivably it could serve as an interim or provisional biblio-

graphy if organized along classified or subject lines. It was principally library publicity: an interest stimulator and perhaps a form of personalized service. It is not difficult to produce; it is a by-product of either the technical processing in a machine operation or a manual operation which shingles catalog cards; or of the shelf-list. It remains to be seen whether its role may not be reappraised, if SDI becomes a way of library life.

(b) Book catalog supplements. As only one facility had a book catalog in use, there was no indication that supplements could be a useful announcement vehicle. The frequency of the update and strategic distribution might be determinative of the issue. If the book catalog contained both classified and unclassified entries - as many do, although the level of classification is usually held to Confidential - security restrictions would limit this medium to its function as a bibliographic control and search tool.

(c) KWIC indexing. None of the organizations visited had a permuted title listing in operation. In one documents library, the computer facility sought to initiate a pilot operation, but after a few issues the experiment was abandoned as contributing little of value to either current awareness or the indexing problem. One facility, contacted by phone, employed a modified KWIC scheme in its book catalog: it used an improved title which, in effect, not only characterized the content more accurately, but also succeeded in normalizing terminology. KWIC, or its many variations, can become extraordinarily cumbersome through sheer bulk, due to the repetition of the identical information in rearranged sequence. It also presents problems in terminological redundancy. On the other hand, it has the virtue of minimizing input difficulties, and employs the current coin of scientific communication without the distortions introduced by normalization.

(d) Title and special listings. With one exception, none of the organizations used special listings for announcement. The one exception maintained a series of reference lists, which it kept unclassified by banishing classified data to a classified supplement. The reference lists, which

revolved about topics of major interest to the organization, contained brief annotations. Currency was assured by the issuance of periodic supplements as updates or by cumulating the entries with each issue. The titles were selective rather than exhaustive, as would be the case for a running or continuing bibliography.

(e) Research digests. One library prepared a formal digest, or resumes as they were called, of in-house research and technical programs, on a quarterly basis. STINFO, of course, is interested in both work in progress and the documenting reports. This would appear to be a useful service, which a library could work up from its holdings or with the collaboration of technical management. In the given example, the frequency may have been appropriate to the scope and pace of the R&D efforts. Another installation prepared a bi-weekly R&D newsletter.

### 3. Current Awareness Program

All of the foregoing, of course, contribute to current awareness. But the pertinent items must be culled from the greater mass of irrelevant or peripheral materials. Consequently, a more individualized service is perhaps called for, if the information requirements of staff are to be satisfied more expeditiously.

(a) Formal SDI (Selective Dissemination of Information). One of the mechanisms devised for this purpose is automatic notification to the user of the availability of documents in which he is presumed to have an interest. Librarians intimately acquainted with a small circle of active customers perform this function reflexively. When, however, they have to service hundreds of clients with innumerable subtle variations in informational needs, the simple personal relationship is inadequate to the task, at least to its consistent accomplishment. With the advent of information processing equipment, it became possible to match the needs of clientele with the available informational resources. The basic mechanism is the characterization of the needs and documental content in identical terms. (We are neglecting other more sophisticated

schemes which assist in bringing about the equivalence relationships.) When a match is found, a notice, often containing an unclassified abstract or annotation of content of the responsive document is sent to the user, who may signify his interest in examining the document. The details of the many existing SDI schemes will not be pursued. Our interest is: do we have schemes in operation for classified literature which give the recipient sufficient information of an unclassified nature preferably to determine whether a document is of interest to him?

The answer, in terms of formal SDI systems observed, was no. The reason was obvious: most of the organizations contacted or visited had manual systems; and this fact alone virtually precludes SDI for any sizeable population. Where EDP or EAM equipment was at the disposal of the library, there was still a reluctance to go to SDI, although four facilities indicated they would be investigating the possibility shortly. In one case, it appeared to be ruled out by a management decision that profiles could become a constraint on the need to know and were undesirable on that account. Another information service, planning a greatly facilitated reference service, could find no justification for SDI in the proposed regime. One student of information technology wasn't at all convinced by the literature or personal observation that SDI was the perfect answer to the information explosion. Significantly, most librarians felt they were in sufficiently close touch with project, area or study requirements, and familiar, on a personal basis, with individual needs. Besides there were other mechanisms at work which accomplished much the same purpose: for example, the requisition slip attached to accession lists permitted the recipient to make the determination for himself without a machine's intervention.

In brief, informal SDI schemes appeared to be working satisfactorily. Project interest files were maintained in several facilities, with prompt notification and establishment of priorities in circulation upon the receipt of relevant materials. Other methods for getting the right material to the needful client will be discussed below. Express requests



by individuals for a particular class of materials were noted, as well as its relationship to present assignments and recent inquiries. The librarian, it turns out, is no mean computer!

SDI gets a big play as an indispensable personalized service enabling the technologist to keep on top of the literature of his specialty. To date two conclusions seem to be emerging: (1) few operations have moved beyond the pilot or experimental stage; (2) criteria for evaluating or justifying SDI are unsatisfactory. It is conceded that SDI systems designed to achieve favorable recall-relevance ratios for individual applications are very expensive in total, although the per capita cost is declared "reasonable" for quantity of output. One of the big questions is, how do we judge quality? In other words, what is SDI operating on? How selective can it really get? Another question is how much more efficient would it be on a group, team, project or study effort? One information facility, presently tussling with the latter question, has concluded that maintenance and refining of an individual client's profile is much too exacting a process. So it intends to explore the group profile, depending upon the usual informal communication process to reach the individual team member.

(b) Automatic distribution lists. Another effective current technique is to put the relevant documents into a client's hands as soon after release as possible. One way of achieving this is by means of original distribution. As often as not this is accomplished automatically, the issuing agency usually being aware of the active research facilities or individual investigators in the field. In a great many cases, if one's organization or a deserving staff member fails to make an original distribution list, the omission may be corrected by either direct request to the producer of the reports or through cooperative channels. Librarians frequently seize the initiative in making these arrangements. Where direct distribution comes about, there is tacit understanding, sometimes a rule, that notification of receipt will be sent to the library, and the document surrendered for at least

modified or accelerated processing. If the document appears to be of reasonably broad interest, additional copies are obtained on secondary distribution.

In several facilities this was indeed routine procedure. In others, there was much reliance on the prominence of the organization, active military liaison, and technical staff initiative in assuring that 85% of the pertinent reports would be received on original distribution.

#### 4. Related Dissemination Services

(a) Circulation. There was less evidence of internal automatic or unsolicited distribution schemes for classified literature. Notifications and priorities were often the rule. Copies addressed directly to individuals generally bypassed the library. However, in one facility all reports classified Secret or lower were turned over to the information center for prompt processing and release to the addressee. One reports library color coded subject catalog cards to signify staff members' special interest, with corresponding provision for getting the document or knowledge of its availability to the appended names. Retention privileges in this connection were quite liberal. Other requests were filled by secondary distribution, or, where urgent and permissible, by reproducing hard copy. Microfiche or film apparently found little acceptance. This was ascribed to lack of adequate or easily accessible equipment, not to mention the decided aversion of clientele to substitutes for full-size copy. On the other hand, space stringencies and the expense of duplicating hard copy had caused at least one library to insist on the use of microfiche for the additional demand. There are, however, many problems in the control of microfiche. One of these problems was handled by making readers, but not reader-printers, generally available. For reproductions of classified material, secure facilities were provided. The biggest trouble, from the point of view of security control, is the ease of losing or misplacing a microfiche duplicate.

(b) Bibliographies. Few facilities were equipped or staffed for extensive compilations. One facility passed

lengthy requests on to DDC. One ran routine searches providing 24 to 48 hour service. Another's input was coded for retrieval, but no program was running as yet. Selective demand bibliographies or limited searches were accommodated. Where urgently required, external resources and services were impressed for exhaustive searches. State-of-the-art reviews could be had in few instances, and then only on special request and authorization. Only one service made a practice of recurrent, running or continuing bibliographies.

(c) Translations. While few had significant holdings in foreign classified literature, and usually checked out the existence of available translations, many regarded provision of translations an essential service. Dependence was on internal staff for the most part; but cleared translation services or consultants were on tap for custom services, on the premises if required.

(d) Technical files organization. As a rule libraries or information activities had nothing to do with technical files while a project was active. But several obtained custody of the stripped-down files, generally after the project definitely phased out and record retention schedules had been satisfied.

Personal technical files organization, an excellent way of becoming acquainted with a patron's information needs, as a library activity, was not in evidence. But librarians were always ready to assist such efforts, time and workload permitting.

## 5. Promotional Activities

Librarians and documentalists will volunteer the information that the percentage of active users is disappointingly low. Libraries are seldom the first resource tapped. There is always the "personal library" at hand, and, when that fails, the fellow at the next bench or a colleague within phone's reach can usually resolve a temporary difficulty.

This means that the library must reach out to the customer rather than await a call to service. The true basis for an active, productive service is as full a knowledge of user needs as possible. As far as classified materials are concerned, the librarian is in an especially favorable position to influence the clientele. Possessing a universal need to know, the librarian is - or should be - fully acquainted with the full range of organizational activities, except for hush-hush matters from which he is properly excluded. It is, moreover, the librarian, not the client, who is the judge of the latter's need to know.

(a) Keeping abreast of user needs. In those organizations where the library or information center is close to top management or reports to the director of research, there is full knowledge of the scope of the various programs, their problems, directions, and progress from start to finish. Very few facilities visited were in such a direct line. Where the library was part of a general technical support group or reported to the administrative side of the house, the contact with projects and technical staff was indirect or informal. As a consequence, the library could not develop an intimate sense of the special informational requirements of the various programs or studies except on its own initiative. We are concerned here with communication from R&D groups on a formal basis. The most effective form is a periodic technical briefing in which the various approaches to problem-solving are set out; the results of investigations critically analyzed; indications given of remaining problems, unsatisfactory solutions, and proposed methods of dealing with them. There is a real sense of participation deriving from these sessions, in which the opportunity is afforded of asking and hearing searching questions and pondering the responses. In the organizations where the library staff was not privy to these technical sessions, some reported that general briefings were given on a semi-annual or even less frequent basis. Most relied on such formal media of communication as progress and status reports, technical memoranda, digests of technical programs, publications of staff in journals, annual reports and catalogs of reports, often compiled by the editorial or public relations activities.

Informal channels were secured by forming good personal relationships with key managerial and technical staff. Several facilities maintained project profiles. Visits to laboratories and conducted tours were not uncommon. The library was usually responsible for arranging registration with DDC and collaborated closely with technical staff to assure adequate subject coverage. Knowing the various assignments of personnel using library services, it was easy to establish rapport through efficient handling of inquiries, thus obtaining an insight into current problem areas. Monitoring routine requests also provided indications of developing user needs. These represent standard, almost instinctive reference techniques, and, by and large, constituted the informal mechanism for keeping up with R&D information requirements. Only in those organizations, very few in number, where security controls were unusually stringent, was this type of communication somewhat hampered, but never completely inhibited.

(b) Library publicity. This is the converse of the foregoing. How does the library reach its potential clientele? All libraries or information centers provided briefings and orientation lectures and conducted tours for the benefit of new staff. For access to classified material, this is a sine qua non, as security controls confront a recruit fresh out of school, industry or even another classified organization with many a prickly question about proper procedures, not to say puzzlement at certain, perhaps idiosyncratic, restrictions. Again, there was unanimity that personal guidance was the most effective means of reaching clientele. The best means of educating a customer was to lead him step by step through the handling of an inquiry from formulation to satisfaction of the quest. Librarians, no matter how pressed by work, always found time for this rewarding missionary work.

Most facilities furnished user guides. Some were little more than highlights of service and road-maps. In several instances, policies and procedures were formally included in organization manuals, or might even be the subject of a command regulation. In the latter case, the initiative might have come from topside, but more often derived from the

librarian's or director's firm sense of the facility's mission, and his desire to be on record. Some had no brochures, but a series of memos which collectively laid down the rules and guidelines for service; oral instruction filled in the omissions or provided clarification. As indicated previously, accessions bulletins often contained notes on library operations. Occasional examples of user guides went well beyond the description of the facility, its resources and services, to instruct the user in the most efficient use of reference materials; gave him in effect a small manual on how to do efficient literature research on the premises.

One facility carried on an active program of research on information techniques, user needs, habits, satisfactions and dissatisfactions with materials and services. It constantly sought to evaluate its own operation, actively seeking feedback from its clientele. The approach was undogmatic and flexible; the questions could be conceptual, factual, or revolve about procedural matters capable of formulation in flow charts and work measurements. The findings, though they had special implications for the local operation, were seldom cast in a parochial mold. In a word, identification with the customer's needs and dedicated service are fine ideals; but they must be tempered with objectivity about one's goals, methods, and actual performance.

## 6. Classification Management

(a) Original classification. None of the facilities had this problem. Original classification was the responsibility of the technical publications group or a program advisory group, which might consist of the author, project head, contract and security officers, and sponsor agency representatives. This applied to classifications through Secret. Top Secret, by virtue of Executive Order 10501, requires higher approval, as delegation of the authority for this designation is severely restricted.

(b) Derivative classification. We shall have more to say about this matter in Section III. However, here it suffices to

say that derivative materials were classified at the level of the documents from which derived. There was, however, considerable uncertainty about the effect on the level of classification of physical association of items, since it is a principle of classification that the ensemble, or collective product, may on occasion require a higher classification than the level of its individual constituents. This doubt could extend to unclassified report listings which might provide a clue to the nature of the classified research being performed by the organization. The impression received was that this, in fact, might have accounted in good part for limiting accessions bulletins, though purged of classified indicia and, hence, unclassified, to internal distribution.

(c) Upgrading, downgrading and declassifying. This constituted a formidable undertaking for which most libraries were unprepared, if their holdings were at all extensive. While the idea of automatic downgrading was to make sure that materials did not remain classified or overclassified any longer than they had a need to be, apparently not much thought had been given to the mechanics of conforming with marking requirements. DDC, recognizing the enormity of the task of changing the markings on the unbound reports it distributed, applied for and received an exemption regarding markings on individual pages. The burden thus rests squarely on the recipients. The solution commonly employed by libraries is to revise only the active reports, in many cases only as they go into circulation. A happy result is the stimulus to energetic weeding in the hope of reducing the problem to manageable proportions.

Upgrading is a nightmarish business. If a publication was unclassified and extensive distribution or circulation made, the possible compromise of the information is no bar to future classification. While there is no accountability as such for documents released in their unclassified status, a program of recall must be instituted. Associated records must be changed to reflect the present classification. Similarly, a change from Confidential to Secret is a substan-

tive change, often affecting both the need-to-know and manner of transmission and accountability records. Fortunately, most libraries maintain circulation records for all materials, classified or unclassified.

Declassification would be a relatively simple matter, since, if justification can be furnished, the original classifier will usually consent to declassification. The problem arises when the organization or user agency which exercised original classification no longer exists and its duties have not been transferred elsewhere. Another troublesome situation is where another agency has an interest in keeping the document classified, when additional consent may be required. However, if a case can be made out for declassification, not much difficulty ensues. This problem will be minimized with the increasing availability of detailed classification guides and more explicit guidelines.

Declassification is often loosely used for paraphrases of or references to classified documents from which classified information or data has been eliminated. Thus, the accessions bulletins or annotated bibliographies which no longer contain classified information are frequently described as such. As suggested above, this can cause no little confusion: declassification is an official action annulling original classification, not a convenient device for providing unclassified characterizations of classified information.

(d) Relationship between the library and security office. This should be a symbiotic relationship, because the library is one of the most vital control points for classified information, and in turn needs all the support and guidance it can get from the security office. Where the security officer is knowledgeable - and those we conferred with were indeed professionals - he will prove sympathetic and helpful in clarifying actual or potential problems in document dissemination and control. Having lived with all manner of incidents and crises, his approach is realistic and discretionary rather than doctrinaire or inflexible. On the other hand, where security



follows the letter rather than the spirit of security and classification regulations, it can reduce a library operation to impotence in respect to the acquisition and utilization of classified materials.

Most installations visited had excellent rapport with security and/or document control. Working arrangements were truly cooperative. In one instance, there appeared to be a misconception of the information center's requirement for classified materials. In yet another, there appeared to be unnecessary restrictions on Secret documents, either out of motives of prudence or betraying a lack of confidence in technical staff's discretion. Apparently there was a failure of fusion of the concepts of classification and security. A very useful device was present in most operations: an internal publication which boiled down the comprehensive official regulations to the meaningful essentials for local application; in a few instances, these were written down to the level of a department or service group, an example being the section on security classification contributed to a style manual by the security officer. With a little encouragement, most libraries could get a custom product dealing with common requirements of library operations, leaving the unusual and contingent for the overall security manual or source documentation.

(e) User relationships. Winning the client's confidence in the matter of access to and control of classified materials is no small matter. It is a truism that a user will generally do without a document rather than be put to any inconvenience in getting it. The object of efficient library service being to get as much mileage out of the collection as possible, the approach to customer service in respect to classified documents should be a positive one: if the need to know can be reasonably resolved in his favor, he should not be left in any doubt about it. Unfortunately, the librarian is not always in a position to determine the need to know. Policy may, for example, dictate that each request for a Secret document must be authorized by a project head, department or laboratory director. Even where the document re-

quested is of the same character as a document previously released to this individual, routine compliance with the rule is expected. The librarian may, however, succeed in getting the rules changed, if he can propose a scheme that is equally consistent with security, yet results in expedited service. One such scheme is maintenance of need to know profiles for all library patrons: if confidence in the librarian's judgment is established, the authority to release the documents may very well be delegated to the librarian. In any case, if the librarian has a firm conviction that a particular security regulation is impractical, it becomes his duty to discuss the matter with appropriate officials. If his contention is vindicated, he will have rendered a service to the organization, the clientele and the cause of realistic security. If not, he will have been made aware of material considerations he overlooked.

### SECTION III

#### PROBLEMS, STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

##### A. Unresolved and Potential Problems

The problems in handling and putting classified information to work stem from relatively recent revolutionary changes in the concept of national defense; the impact of large-scale science and technology on the conduct of war and peace; the polarization of ideologies and political-military alignments between the democratic and communistic societies; and advanced communication and information technology. One of the prominent outgrowths of these developments is the proliferation of a type of literature, much of it classified, - the report - which industry originally used for the administration, monitoring and protection of proprietary interests in research and development. Industry, however, aimed ultimately at the publication of the results in conventional scientific and technical media such as professional journals and monographic series.

The report literature, while uneven in quality and somewhat difficult to control bibliographically, is presumably essential to the operation of R&D programs in the organizations and installations which dip into an annual 16 billion dollar pot. A leading problem in connection with report literature is security control of the classified corpus. Levels of classification have been placed on these documents, which, among other considerations, depend upon the advanced nature of the technology described, the secrecy of which confers on the possessor the advantages of lead time, surprise and initiative with respect to a competitor or opponent, actual or potential. With increasing level of classification, dissemination of the document is progressively restricted. The problem is thus seen to be the reconciliation of two contradictory policies: the urgency of communicating new developments or state-of-the-art in science and technology as opposed to the necessity for maintaining secrecy to the outside world. A satisfactory resolution of the problem has not been achieved, because a con-

sistent logical or philosophical basis is lacking, which, even if it could be formulated, would have to be workable.

We pass over the value of classified reports to look at the question of the "need to know". "Knowledge or possession of classified defense information shall be permitted only to persons whose official duties require such access in the interest of promoting national defense....", says Executive Order 10501. The astonishing range of access permitted under this restriction reveals its imprecision. The fact that nobody has come up with a better definition of the "need to know" is conclusive that its application carries with it a large measure of discretion. What is the effect on information flow? We have seen that the academic community permits great latitude in determining the need to know; at the other extreme is the military who interpret access narrowly. In between is the industrial complex, which for purposes of its own access prefers a liberalized definition, but is likely to look for strict interpretation when dealing with third parties or, possibly, in its internal operations if the control problem is difficult. Administration of the access privilege is clearly not only non-uniform but, in the absence of workable guidelines, only too often arbitrary.

This, however, is only one aspect of the problem. There are other variations in compliance with the rule for access which illustrate its difficult character even more graphically and have a more subtle but equally pernicious influence. For example, purely as a practical matter, DDC's distribution bases the need to know upon a field-of-interest register composed of broad categories of information - it now uses COSATI categories - approved by responsible technical and administrative officials. Military commands are presumed to have a need to know for anything related to their mission. Here, for example, no close scrutiny can be placed on the actual content of a document to determine whether it is required for "official duties in the interest of national defense." A compromise has been worked out, whereby this function has been transferred to the recipient facility which releases the material to its personnel. It is readily seen that this stratagem will be applied to all central-

ized information activities under the STINFO program and specialized information analysis centers.

So let's take a closer look at this deviation and see what harm it produces. We have a request for a document or information at DDC or an information center. Our profile in terms of the need to know is on file and is checked against the request. The document, however, has been analyzed and categorized according to its main topics, never more than three or four. It does, however, contain information relevant to our needs, as may be ascertained from examination of the document itself, or even from the descriptors and abstracts appearing in TAB. But, as a practical matter, DDC or any other information center is constrained to limit its relevance to a very few categories, or its identification of user need to know breaks down. Hence, unless one's spectrum of interests covers most of the COSATI categories, you can expect to be shut out of a great deal of information rightfully yours in terms of a legitimate need to know. A low-noise device used in radar detection may not be available to a registrant who produces communication equipment.

The question does not arise in unclassified literature, because an item will be retrieved on the basis of index terms or descriptors. If the indexing is in reasonable depth, it doesn't matter whether the searching is by means of an inverted file or sequentially by document, a proper match determines the issue. Not so, if security classification considerations are involved, because the context is all-important. A series of descriptors may be sufficiently general in character to pose a seemingly unclassified question; but the answer, or the application, may well be embodied in a classified document. Hence, in the automated systems presently available or in the foreseeable future, whether they retrieve documents or furnish information, unless access is predetermined and the output screened on an individual basis, the system comes to grief on the strength of the need to know. There are severe limitations on a machine's decision-making capacity.

If we take these considerations a step further, and look at some of the blue-sky proposals for multiple access and man-

machine interaction, we find, as Douglas Parkhill points out in "The Challenge of the Computer Facility", that supervisory programs cannot prevent, in a manner which will satisfy security requirements, unauthorized access to files. Moreover, constraining the need to know in terms of security-classification is incredibly difficult at best, and impossibly expensive at worst, to consider man-machine interaction, even if we disregard the question of secure communications.

But there are more mundane problems which need clarification. How can we, in the case of security restrictions, provide a more satisfactory current awareness program by means of surrogates for the classified document? We have seen that the librarians complained that DDC's unclassified abstracts were too general to permit effective screening, resulting in wasteful acquisition and needless control costs. Yet DDC employed specialists to reveal what could be revealed in unclassified form. How can a library or modest information facility achieve a better product when it is inadequately staffed? Is it at all possible that the solution lies in relaxing derivative classification, when the information is skeletonized, and the product, like TAB, is protected against unauthorized access?

The problem of derivative classification seems also to play a role, as indicated previously, in degrading interlibrary cooperation. Since accessions lists rarely circulate beyond an organization's confines, even when all entries are unclassified, how is it possible to make one's resources in classified information known to another facility which may have a need for some of the materials? Will union lists of classified documents be available only at switching centers? Can local facilities operate a cooperative classified documents acquisitions program? Or are duplicate collections of microfiche the answer?

What answer do we make to the so-called "third-party" rule, which prohibits dissemination of classified defense information outside the receiving department or agency without the consent of the originating department or agency? Does one always refer the requester, even when the requirement for access is well established, to DDC or elsewhere? The STINFO program

looks for cooperation among information resources. Referral centers alert one to additional sources. DDC will answer queries relating to work in progress described in DD 1498's. Will inquiries to the source be deflected?

There are answers to these questions in the security regulations, and more emphatically in the cautionary practices of libraries and information centers. Yet, the local library operation is in danger of becoming a mere conduit or control point for information analysis centers, switching centers and automated centralized services, unless special attention is given to the security-classification issue in any and all discussions of centralized-decentralized information networks.

#### B. Further Studies

The first study appropriate to the topics discussed herein is a more representative coverage of dissemination practices in libraries and technical information facilities handling large volumes of classified documents, preferably on an automated basis. The present study covered small to medium-size operations, chiefly manual, inadequately funded, understaffed, with modestly growing collections of classified documents. Few had anything but elementary current awareness programs. No reliable conclusions could be drawn as to the magnitude of the classified documents handling problems, but their outlines were clearly discernible. The impressions were largely negative. The libraries believed they were doing as well as could be done under the circumstances.

As an independent but parallel effort, a clinic or workshop on the handling of the classified technical report literature should be planned which will not only explore present practices, with emphasis on successful dissemination in a balanced array of information facilities, but should reveal attitudes consciously or unconsciously conditioning the quality of the service. A principal object should be to get the participants to speak their minds freely on any and all aspects of the security-classification issue. The response to the security-classification talks at the Rio Grande workshop on report

literature augurs well for the suggested program, although on the former occasion the questions recorded focused on technicalities rather than on fundamental issues. The clinic could be conducted on a regional basis with a preplanned itinerary; or, the program could wait on initial results for re-formatting subsequent sessions.

Another related study would attempt to discover the use and utility of classified information as determined by such factors as: (1) mission; (2) discipline; (3) type of user; there seems to be a confirmed belief that the most active users are hardware-oriented personnel; (4) part of the RDTE cycle; (5) content; (6) presentation and format; (7) availability and convenience of access; (8) the influence of current awareness programs; (9) determination of the half-life and statistical data on average usage; (10) security inhibitions; etc. The purpose of the study would be to make a determination of whether, as claimed, there is under-utilization of classified materials and for what significant reasons; or whether its character is such that it recommends itself to a specialized and limited audience only. The study mentioned above would provide useful input for this investigation.

A study of the evolution of the security-classification program, from the historical, socio-political and behavioral viewpoints rather than the legalistic approach, would go far to dispel the irrational fears about security and the depreciation by many outside the security community. It would promote an appreciation of the sincere efforts toward discovering a more efficient formula for administration, as well as reveal the reasons for failure. Security management is an all-too-human activity: decisions and value judgments can prove agonizing, particularly under certain types of abnormal pressure. This would be a monumental undertaking, only small parts of the picture having been filled in by hearings and the reports of special commissions. If properly executed, the perspective gained would be an invaluable frame of reference for meaningful examinations of current problems.

Still another approach, whose features are rather vague at the moment, would be an operations research study of security



administration, employing simulation or possibly performing a series of innocuous - from the point of view of security infraction - experiments with various configurations of security-classification administration.

A useful tool would be a compilation of source statutes and regulations governing security-classification matters in libraries. (Appendix B is a preliminary checklist.) Although excellent guides are provided by the various departments and agencies, the source documentation frequently clarifies the compendious statements found in them and indicates the official authority for matters within the scope of the regulation. The difficulty is the problem of maintenance: changes are more frequent than ever before. However, there appears to be a consolidation of regulations within the Department of Defense, as pointed out in Section II, and it may confidently be expected that the present mass of departmental regulations will be greatly contracted. The means for assembling them exist in normal distribution channels.

#### Summary of Suggested Studies:

We find that more information is needed in the impact of the security classification program on library operation.

1. The immediate need is for an extensive survey as a follow-up on the inadequate data base afforded by the present study. This should provide greater representation of automated operations with large classified holdings and a high volume of accessions. A liberal sampling of information analysis centers should be included in the population surveyed.

2. To supplement the formal survey, a clinic or workshop should be held, open to the widest possible participation by librarians, information specialists, security and classification managers, and STINFO officials, to bring the problems of handling classified materials into the open. The sessions would be conducted on a nationwide, regional basis, either simultaneously or as a progressive itinerary. A forum of this nature has a

cathartic effect at the very least; at best it will direct an appropriate degree of attention to a difficult aspect of information handling in support of the defense effort.

3. More fundamental studies are required to supply the factual basis for policymaking, both as regards the quality and utility of classified literature, and the effects of past, present and predictable direction of the security-classification systems. The study suggested in (1) above would provide valuable input for this investigation.

4. At a higher level and somewhat apart from the information handling concerns as such, a direct attack on the problem of whether the security-classification system really accomplishes what it is presumably designed to do might be mounted. This consists of related projects: (a) an historical and sociopolitical study of its development; (b) an operations research approach employing simulated studies of various alternative configurations.

5. Finally, source materials, i.e., a compilation of statutes, executive orders, and regulations, etc. on security and classification, should be made available for the clarification of procedures and indication of channels for decision on points not covered by security manuals. The appended checklist contributes to this objective.

#### C. Recommendations

##### 1. Security

William Knox has penetrating advice for improving library service ("National information networks and special libraries," Special Libraries, Nov. 1966: p. 627-30.)

"A sound assessment must be made of the values placed on library services by the user. Latent values, unrecognized by the user, must be made explicit. Hidden barriers to information use must be brought into the open and demolished, and the information service must be organized in direct response to the user's complete spectrum of value judgments."

The suggestion has profound implications for classified information handling. We have previously indicated that, if the library is to survive the onslaughts of its critics, it must provide convenient, accessible, personalized service to its clientele. Nowhere is this more critical than in the area of the classified reports collection. There are not only hidden barriers but visible roadblocks to unimpeded service. These are ostensibly due to security-classification requirements. However, it is the attitude shaped by the requirements, whether in the nay-saying of the librarian or the discouragement of the client, that perfects the mischief. For confident dissemination of classified information, the security machinery must be made invisible as far as possible. The customer demands satisfaction of his information needs; he has a low threshold of frustration. If materials are hard to come by and service grudging, both the client and the library are diminished.

What this implies is that the librarian must take a positive attitude toward the security program. He must cease complaining about restrictions and insist upon a level of dissemination which complies with the permissive aspects of Executive Order 10501 as implemented by DOD directives and departmental regulations. The client must be reminded of limitations only when strictly necessary.

How can this change in attitude be accomplished? The first step in this direction is a complete reorientation of security briefings and indoctrination. The punitive, restrictive, and cautionary features, while necessary to a full exposition of the security system, must be shown to be only a part of the total picture. The emphasis should be on measures taken, within statutory authority, to increase the flow of information by eliminating overclassification; continuous review to downgrade and declassify; automatic downgrading and phased declassification; establishment of national documentation, referral and analysis centers, and sponsorship of the STINFO network of information services.

The library should cultivate a good working relationship with the security office and administrators involved in classi-

fication procedures. This not only obviates oppressive restrictions on library services but provides a dependable source of advice and support in planning, policy formulation, and solution of everyday problems. These officials are exercising a responsibility assigned by law, and have direct channels to authoritative counsel.

Librarians should discuss with management the possibility of receiving training as intensive as that provided security officers, except for matters primarily concerned with personnel and physical security. Education in security-classification must be continuous, or practice may lag fast-changing regulations. Librarians should be on the routing list for the Security Newsletter. Briefings should be held as often as required to keep librarians abreast of developments affecting their operation. A classification management office or the equivalent should be available on the premises for prompt resolution of problems in original and derivative classification as well as guidance on questions of access. Arrangement should be made for attendance at symposia or seminars conducted by military departments and agencies or national security organizations. Complete sets of reference and source materials should be available for first-hand acquaintance with applicable regulations. Failing local resources of this nature, directorates at departmental and command levels should afford like facilities for quick reaction on referred inquiries.

A delicate issue is the staffing of the security office. Executive Order 10501 calls for the designation of experienced persons to coordinate security activities and provide orientation and training. Yet the choice of a suitable security officer at local installations is often a matter of economics. The policy of an organization doing a substantial amount of classified work or handling a significant volume of classified materials should be to hire a security specialist of professional stature. Our survey provided evidence that the training and experience of the security officer can spell the difference between a viable and nominal classified information service.

Formal channels should be established for review of pro-

posals for modification or revision of security practices, and their transmittal, if deemed advisable, to appropriate officials for decision. A single example, discussed above, indicates how effective this might be. Downgrading at present requires the obliteration of previous indicia and substitution of new markings on a page-by-page basis in unbound volumes. A bound volume has come to be defined in terms of conventional bookbinding practice, although Executive Order 10501 makes the criterion "the pages of which are permanently and securely fastened together." Librarians, appalled at the labor involved, balk at compliance for any but actively used materials. Might they not have sought a ruling which takes account of modern mechanical fasteners or adhesives? Or could they not have aired the issue in a forum or through channels capable of engendering a definitive solution to the overall problem?

We recommend to management that the costs of security control in libraries be charged to the security program or general overhead and the amount liberated be returned to the library in the form of additions to the budget, personnel or both. The mechanics of handling classified materials contribute nothing to the information function of the library. They absorb valuable time and effort which could be released for improved library performance. We have adverted to criticisms directed at the library by STINFO and COSATI leaders. Libraries are a key control center in the security scheme. They have an outstanding opportunity to serve the user of classified literature, if they can be cut loose for intellectual tasks as described in the following passage (Systems Development Corporation, Santa Monica. The Information Center. Emory H. Holmes, 4 August 1964):

"Information centers have evolved as a result of the inability of traditional libraries to meet the needs of scientists, researcher, and scholar.... Among the areas in which better performance is sought are the capability to accept or accommodate deeper probing or questioning of a classification structure, better current awareness of literature, and active rather than passive service to users."

What services can the library render in relation to classified materials, even in the face of the "relative poverty of libraries"? As Launor Carter puts it ("National document-handling systems in science and technology," Science, December 1966, p. 1299-1304):

"Usually libraries have barely been able to fund their current operations, let alone experiment with new techniques."

## 2. Library Activities

(a) Acquisitions. Many critics of library practice have urged de-emphasis of acquisitions in favor of depth analysis of materials. This is a siren call the librarian had best shut his ears to. On the contrary, he should conduct an aggressive program of acquiring classified materials, or they just won't be available when needed. The means is now at hand. DDC is a referral center for information on R&D in progress contained in DD Form 1498s. The advance notice permits the librarian to arrange for original distribution of technical reports within the organization's field of interest and level of clearance. Timeliness of receipts allows more time for processing, and reduces dependence on secondary distribution. Secondary distribution can be used for additional copies should the reports prove worthwhile. Fairly rigorous selection will be required. If the library does not have technically competent personnel, it should enlist the aid of the technical staff in deciding what to retain and in what depth the material should be analyzed.

To develop an adequate documentation base, the library must have full and timely information on all technical programs in the house. If the librarian is not a member of project planning teams ex officio and is not invited to technical reviews or briefings, he should on his own initiative seek out department heads, project directors and key technical personnel for particulars on R&D objectives and probable information needs. Contacts of this nature are easily arranged,

since more than likely they will be among the library's most active patrons. To stoke project fires with fresh information, project and individual user files should be maintained as clues to emergent needs. Besides their obvious utility as acquisitions and selective dissemination aids, they may also provide a technical expertise or resources inventory.

Nevertheless, if at all possible, the librarian should attempt to get management sanction for admission to technical sessions, in order to develop a feeling of active involvement in the organization's mission. Nothing succeeds in winning management's and technical staff's confidence as much as a sincere attempt to understand their problems in sufficient depth to intelligently anticipate information requirements. Time and duties permitting, the librarian should foster his own technical education and awareness by attending conferences and symposia, and local meetings of professional associations, dealing with topics relating to the organization's work. These sessions are not only of intrinsic value, but they afford an excellent opportunity for discovering new sources of information.

Briefly, the librarian in a technical organization must actively foster his own current awareness, much as the scientist has to keep abreast of developments within and sometimes peripheral to his specialty. The librarian, moreover, has much the more onerous responsibility: his scope is so much broader, even if his knowledge of the individual specialties in aggregate is necessarily superficial.

(b) Technical processing. In processing classified reports full advantage should be taken of existing indexing and abstracting services. If there is compatibility of indexing vocabulary - the joint COSATI-EJC Thesaurus may be useful in this connection - and the time lag is no greater than a month or so, then analysis might be left open-ended, to be supplemented by pertinent entries found in TAB, ACR and C-STAR, for example. If an advance index-abstract service comes into being, processing in understaffed libraries will be immensely facilitated.

Another advantage of keeping cataloging and analysis open-ended is, as several facilities surveyed demonstrated, that critical feedback from the technical staff can correct mistakes in indexing and add elements of information overlooked in analysis. Make technical staff a member of the library analysis and evaluation team. They will normally appreciate being consulted and will respond in kind. However, unless released by management for direct library assistance, their cooperation must be solicited with discretion.

Freezing cataloging-analysis at the first pass is seen to be undesirable. For one thing, the deliberation involved delays getting the reports to the user. For another, there are many ways of looking at technical information. While it may not be practicable to encompass all of them, at least some of these are seen to be important to the organization's mission. Nor should the DD 1473 included in the document be overlooked. It may represent the author's summary of the implications of his study. In time this should prove to be the case, although at present the information is often perfunctory.

(c) Current Awareness. The foregoing recommendations have a bearing on current awareness programs, since the material for current awareness is derived from processing activities. Most studies are in agreement that keeping current is a constant preoccupation of the scientist and engineer, because technical obsolescence cannot be tolerated. Hence, current awareness is probably the most potent technique at the librarian's disposal for winning the confidence of clientele. To be effective it must be timely, accessible and properly packaged for use.

Accessibility is a problem with classified announcement media. If there is a choice, classified reports should be announced in unclassified form. If this means suppressing some information, a decision should be made whether enough remains for the user to judge whether a particular report is relevant to his needs. If experience shows that titles are insufficient for this purpose, then a brief annotation can



improve the title. Where these listings are voluminous, it may be advisable to go to two publications: classified for limited distribution and unclassified for wide distribution, even display. NASA, for example, limits C-STAR to the Confidential level. Harry Diamond Laboratories' "ABC" catalog is also Confidential.

What is essential, in any case, is that current awareness issuances be packaged for convenience of use. The MICRO and CIRC schemes employed by System Development Corporation can provide listings at various levels of description: a straightforward bibliographic description; with descriptors; and with abstract. These may be further delimited by broad subject categories. If the library can afford no more than an accessions list in the way of current awareness, it should attempt to arrange simple bibliographic information under COSATI or other appropriate subject categories, if the number of items is large. Other expedients such as detailed indexing may be included, if time, staff and funds permit. However, it is often questionable whether a browsing tool like an accessions list is consulted through the index for current awareness, or the index is used for retrospective reference.

Timeliness of announcement was indicated as an important consideration. Nevertheless, the suggestion that announcements should not wait on the completion of processing must be qualified. Announcements too far in advance of actual availability of the documents for circulation generate frustration when demands cannot be satisfied at once. Sufficient lead time to permit a choice by the "eager beavers" among the clientele should be provided.

1. Selective dissemination-of-information (SDI). The question of the efficiency of an SDI scheme is moot with respect to individual service. Most organizations with considerable experience are gradually coming to the conclusion that team or project profiles make the operation much more manageable, because there is a tremendous amount of redundancy in individual profiles. Hence, a group profile will more than likely satisfy most user requirements.

SDI, as was noted in the preceding section, was practiced informally by most of the libraries visited. SDI is, however, in the main a machine operation, and can only be operated consistently with EAM or EDP equipment where the number of accessions and distributees is large. It appears out of the question, unless funding is provided, for most libraries. Accordingly, it is suggested that libraries work up a case for machine access and present it to management for action. The way to do this is to initiate a pilot operation by whatever means are at hand, and, the results being favorable, allow the pressure by technical staff for continued and expanded service to persuade management to allocate funds and personnel. Most computer facilities are happy to become involved.

The special problem with classified information is that subject areas rather than descriptors determine the need to know. It may be necessary to employ an edit function to suppress portions of the input carrying classified information, such as the subject headings or descriptors and abstract, unless abstracts can be "sanitized" or prepared in an unclassified manner. DD 1473's will prove helpful in this regard. A restricted access browsing room should be provided, so that the user can screen classified reports whose relevance to his interests cannot be determined from the information furnished.

Feedback is important to determine the relevance of the documents selected to the user's interests reflected in his profile, and to correct the profile if it doesn't correspond with present needs. However, the user should not be badgered or pressed to obtain it. He will usually volunteer the information.

(d) Demand Bibliographies. One of the measures suggested for evaluating SDI systems is the extent to which demand bibliographies drop off. If an SDI system is feasible, then it may become the case that occasional requests for topical bibliographies can be accommodated by the library without distress. On the other hand, if the library cannot service the demand bibliography, it can do two things which will keep it

in its customer's good graces. One is to spot "hot" topics by keeping close watch on inquiries, and to anticipate demand by preparing and maintaining running or recurring bibliographies on the subjects. The other is to make it as convenient as possible to have a staff member prepare his own bibliography by placing materials at his disposal, providing guidance and auxiliary bibliographic and reference services. A record should be maintained of these special bibliographies, no matter by whom produced, to make them more generally available.

(e) State-of-the-art reports. Many studies have reached the conclusion that retrospective searches are less important than "detailed analyses", among which may be included "state-of-the-art" reports. This is one of the services for which the analysis center is particularly adapted. Since presumably much of the state-of-the-art is contained in the classified literature - certainly where hardware is concerned - the library should insist on at least becoming involved in the process, even if it does not have sufficient staff or technically competent personnel to prepare a review. Again, as in the case of retrospective searches, if the technical staff cannot be detached for working on a state-of-the-art summary for the library, the library can seize the initiative by pointing out, on the basis of requests and inquiries, the need for one, and collaborating actively with whoever is assigned the task.

(f) Pushing classified information. Finally, the library must publicize its classified holdings and its resources for obtaining these materials instead of pouring out tales of woe to customers on the difficulties encountered in obtaining and controlling the materials. As repeated over and over again throughout this study, as custodian of the classified report, the library can really make its mark with the technical staff. It should seek to avoid practices which compel the user to come to a possibly inaccessible location to personally accept and hand-carry documents. It should seek to supplement hard copy with microfiche, since frequently all that is required is simple viewing, or, at most, the reproduction of one or two pages of a long report. By announcing, disseminating and

( providing easy access, within security constraints, to the classified literature, the librarian can render a positive service to his clientele and promote the objectives of STINFO.

## APPENDIX A

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## APPENDIX B

### CHECKLIST OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING SECURITY/ CLASSIFICATION FOR DOD LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICES

#### Executive Orders (as amended)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
10501(18FR7049)	Safeguarding official information
10450(18FR2489)	Security requirements for Government employees
10865(25FR1583)	Safeguarding classified information within industry

#### U.S. Code (1964 edition)

5USC22-1	Suspension of civilian officers and
22-2	employees of certain Departments and
22-3	Agencies for natural security reasons
5USC631	Regulation of admission to Civil Service
5USC1002	Public information availability
15USC1151-57	Dissemination of technical, scientific and engineering information
18USC371	Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States
18USC793	Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information
18USC798	Disclosure of classified information
22USC1934	Munitions control
22USC2311-21	Military assistance
22USC2370	Prohibitions against furnishing assistance
22USC2381	Exercise of functions, etc.
E.O.10973	Administration of foreign assistance and
(26FR10469)	related functions
22USC2382	Coordination with foreign policy
22USC238	Secretary of Defense; responsibilities, priorities in procurement, delivery and allocation of military equipment
35USC181-88	Patent Secrecy Act of 1952
50USC401et seq	National Security Act
50USC781et seq	Internal Security Act
50USC App2021-32	Export Control Act

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
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Department of State Regulation

108.520	International traffic in arms
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Armed Services Procurement Regulation (1963ed.)

1-308	Record of contract actions
1-320	Industrial Security
4-211	Scientific and technical reports
7-104.12	Military security requirements
7-402.24	Military security requirements
16-807	Document control data -- R & D (DD Form 1473)
16-811	Security requirements check list (DD Form 254)

Department of Defense Directives and Instructions

2003.3	International interchange of patent rights and technological information
2110.6	Public information policy and procedures concerning military assistance
3200.8	Standards and documentation of technical reports under the DoD Scientific and Technical Information Program
5025.1	DoD directive system
5025.2	Publication of joint regulations of the Armed Forces (Federal Register)
5025.5	Review of official publications
5030.14	Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group (JAIEG)
5030.16	DoD policy on furnishing information to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
5030.18	Department of Defense Support of NASA
5030.28	Munitions control procedures for U.S. Munitions List export license applications referred to DoD by the State Department
5105.19	Defense Communications Agency
5105.20	Defense representation, United States Mission to North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European regional organizations.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
5105.21	Defense Intelligence Agency
5105.26	Defense Intelligence Agency (Publications)
5105.28	Defense Intelligence Agency (Technical Intelligence)
5105.31	Defense Atomic Support Agency
5110.3	Supervision and coordination of the DoD information security program
5120.33	Classification management program
5122.2	Responsibilities of the Office of ASD (PA)-functions of the Directorate for Security Review
5126.37	DoD technical logistics and data information
5129.33	DoD Advanced Research Projects Agency
5129.43	Assignment of functions to the Defense Scientific and Technical Information Program
5132.3	Department of Defense policy and responsibilities relating to military assistance
5132.9	NATO Force planning group
5145.3	Surveillance of DoD security programs
5148.1	Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission
5154.19	Defense logistics studies information exchange
5160.5	Responsibility for RDT&E on chemical and biological warfare
5160.48	DoD information training
5160.54	DoD industrial defense program
5200.1	Safeguarding official information in the interests of the defense of the U.S.
5200.6	Policy governing the custody, use and preservation of Department of Defense official information which requires protection in the public interest
5200.8	Authority of military commanders under Internal Security Act of '50 to issue security orders and regulations for protection of property or places under their command
5200.9	Declassification and downgrading of certain information originated before January 1, 1946

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
5200.10	Downgrading and declassification of classified defense information
5200.12	Security measures, approval and sponsorship for scientific and technical meetings involving disclosure of classified information
5200.14	Defensive security briefings
5200.15	Controlling the dissemination and use of intelligence information produced by members of the intelligence community
5200.18	Security classification guide for laser (optical maser) information
5200.20	Distribution statements (other than security) on technical documents
5200.21	Certification for access to scientific and technical information
5200.22	Reporting of security and criminal violations
5210.2	Access to and dissemination of restricted data
5210.7	DoD civilian applicant and employee security program
5210.8	Policy on investigation and clearance of DoD personnel for access to classified defense information
5210.9	Military personnel security program
5210.15	Loyalty certificates for members of the ROTC
5210.18	Use of Pentagon pulping plant for destroying classified DoD material
5210.19	Procedures for protection of NATO couriers while in U.S. during emergency or general alert conditions
5210.20	Policy governing transmission of classified defense information via classified pneumatic tube system in the Pentagon
5210.23	Policy concerning consideration of loyalty/scientific researchers on DoD unclassified research contracts
5210.31	Uniform guide lines for arriving at common sense determinations in the military personnel security program

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
5230.14	Advanced planning briefings for industry
5230.15	Policies and procedures for regulating access to critical category atomic weapons and stockpile production infor- mation
5230.16	Nuclear accident and incident public affairs plan
5400.1	Dissemination of information to reserve components and public
5400.3	Distribution of photographs and motion pictures to foreign nationals
5400.4	Provision of information to the congress
7720.12	Reporting of current research and explor- atory effort at the work unit level
7720.16	Research and Technology Resume (DOD Form 1498 for R&D Program Review)

#### Army Regulations

1-18	Military conferences and other activities having international implications
1-28	Army study documentation and information retrieval system (ASDIRS)
1-211	Attendance at meetings of technical, scientific, professional and other similar private organizations
50-3	Personnel security standards for nuclear capable organizations and activities
66-5	Courier service; general provisions
70-7	Army research, development, test and evaluation program reports
70-9	Research and Technology Resume
70-11	Defense Documentation Center for scientific and technical information
70-12	Army research and development laboratory notebooks
70-21	Certification for access to classified scientific and technical information
70-22	Centers for analysis of scientific and technical information
70-26	Research and development symposia, con- ferences and technical meetings

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
5210.38	Carrying of firearms by civilian personnel
5210.39	Security classification guide for proximity fuzes and components
5210.41	Criteria & standards for safeguarding atomic weapons
5210.42	Reliability of personnel assigned to duties involving nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems
5210.43	Security termination statement and debriefing procedures
5210.44	Security orientation, education and training
5210.45	Personnel security in the National Security Agency
5210.46	DoD building security for Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Area
5210.47	Security classification of official information
5210.48	Conduct of polygraph examinations and selection, training and supervision of DoD polygraph examiners
5210.49	Security classification guides for DoD construction projects
5210.50	Investigation of and disciplinary action connected with unauthorized disclosure of classified defense information
5220.5	Industrial dispersal
5220.6	Industrial personnel access authorization review regulation
5220.22	DoD industrial security program
5220.22-R	Industrial security regulation
5220.22-M	Industrial security manual for safeguarding classified information
5230.3	Information releases by manufacturers
5230.4	Release of information on atomic energy, guided missiles and new weapons
5230.5	Information releases by colleges and universities holding defense contracts
5230.7	Censorship planning
5230.9	Clearance of DoD public information
5230.13	Principles of public information policy

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
70-31	Standards for technical reporting
70-41	Cooperation with allies in research and development of defense equipment
70-45	Scientific and Technical Information Program
105-31	Message preparation
135-380	Release of classified information to Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve and Reserve Officers' Training Corps.
310-1	Military publications; general policies
310-7	Distribution of category sigma 3 publications containing RESTRICTED DATA atomic weapons information
310-70	Preparation, procurement and joint use of technical data and publications
310-75	Defense Communications Agency publications
345-15	Safeguarding non-defense information
360-5	Army information; general policies
360-27	Release of information by manufacturers, colleges and universities holding Army contracts, and other commercial entities.
360-41	Release of information on chemical and biological weapons and defense
360-42	Information guidance for Nike-X research and development program
360-45	Public information and community relations activities
360-70	Policy and procedures concerning military assistance
380-5	Safeguarding defense information
380-6	Automatic, time-phased downgrading and declassification system
(C) 380-10	Department of the Army policy for disclosure of military information to foreign governments
(S) 380-11	Classified title
380-12	Release of classified information to officer students
(C) 380-15	Safeguarding classified NATO information
(CM) 380-16	Safeguarding classified Central Treaty Organization information
(CM) 380-17	Safeguarding classified SEATO information
380-20	Restricted areas

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
380-24	Security measures, approval and sponsorship for scientific and technical meetings involving disclosure of classified information
380-25	Visitors
380-26	Policy for use of Encrypt-For-Transmission Only (EFTO) procedure
(S) 380-30	Reporting of critical intelligence (CRITTC) (U)
380-31	Classification of aerial photography
380-32	Security classification guide for proximity fuzes and components
380-33	Construction projects security classification guides
(O) 380-40	Safeguarding crypto-information
(O) 380-41	Control of cryptomaterial
380-45	Procedures for review of classified defense information subjected to unauthorized disclosure as a result of crypto-security compromise
(S) 380-46	Restriction on the use of information processing equipment (U)
(C) 380-47	Measures to prevent acoustic interception (U)
(C) 380-51	Transmission of classified information (U)
380-55	Safeguarding defense information in movement of persons and things
(O) 380-86	Chemical and biological weapons classification
380-105	Policy and procedure governing use of code words
380-130	Department of Defense Industrial Security Regulation
380-150	Security of restricted data
380-150-30	Foreign atomic devices and component parts
380-157	Policy and procedure for regulating access to critical atomic weapons stockpile and production information
(C) 380-165	Security classification assignments of identification friend or foe (IFF) information and equipment (U)
(C) 380-350-2	Captured enemy documents (U)



<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
(O) 381-1	Controlling the dissemination and use of intelligence information produced by members of the intelligence community
(C) 381-2	Disclosure of classified intelligence
381-7	Request for intelligence documents
(C) 381-16	Intelligence processing--DIA Dissemination Center (U)
(C) 551-38	Security screening procedures for members of the forces of NATO Nations entering the United States (U)
(S) 580-10	Policy and procedures governing the disclosure and/or exchange of atomic information under agreements for cooperation
(C) 580-12	Release of information concerning guided missiles and vulnerability of weapons systems to electronic counter measures.
580-15	Security requirements for nuclear weapons
604-5	Clearance of personnel for access to classified defense information and material
604-10	Military personnel security clearance
604-11	Resolution of adverse suitability information
604-13	Implementation of personnel security program
604-20	Security requirements for personnel information and education activities
604-45	Designation of organizations in connection with the Federal Employee Security Program
604-305	Civilian employee security program requirements
620-220-1	Security investigations and adjudications
(C) 705-10	Electronic security during research and development (U)
705-27	Research and Technology Resume (DD Form 1498) for research and development program planning review

Navy Regulations

OPNAV Instructions

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
2260.5	Tri-Service regulation of Armed Forces Courier Service
02581.1C	Access to CRYPTO and other classified information by naval reserve, naval security group personnel who are not on continuous active duty (U)
3822.4A	Dissemination of intelligence documents to Department of Defense contractors; policy and procedures for
05450.47	Implementation of SEATO Security policy and procedures (U)
5500.10C	Access to the classified records in the custody of the Director, Naval History Division
5500.24	U.S. Navy sponsored visits to foreign countries
5500.33	Department of Navy Long Range Scientific and Technical Planning Program
5500.39	Controlling the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information produced by members of the intelligence community
5500.40B	Automatic, time-phased downgrading and declassification system
5500.48	Classification management program
5510.3G	Visits and conferences involving access to and dissemination of restricted data
05510.25D	Physical security policy standard and criteria for safeguarding nuclear weapons ashore (U)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
5510.27F	Implementation of NATO security procedures
05510.32	Security classification of radar scope photography; policy concerning (U)
P5510.45	United States Navy physical security manual
05510.46A	Implementation of NATO security procedures (U)
005510.48B	Manual for disclosure of military information to foreign governments (U)
5510.49A	Guide for the handling and control of classified matter
5510.53A	Command responsibility for implementation of SEATO security procedures
05510.54	Implementation of CENTO security regulations and assignments of command responsibility for security of CENTO classified information
05510.56	Defense classification of wartime organization (U)
05510.75	NATO supplemental security principles and practices (U)
05510.80A	Handling of and granting access to material marked "CRYPTO"; procedures for (U)
05510.82	Security of electrically processed information (U)
5510.83	Criteria and standards for safeguarding nuclear weapons
05510.93	Classified Subject
05510.95	Special procedures for safeguarding magnetic media; interim policy for (U)
5511.9A	Authority of military commanders under the Internal Security Act of 1950 to issue security orders and regulations for the protection of property or places under their command

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
5511.16B	Policy and procedures governing use of code words
5511.25C	Policy and procedures for regulating clearance for receiving critical category atomic weapons stockpile and production information
5511.31B	Distribution of Restricted Data documents obtained from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA)
5520.8	Compromise of classified matter through press releases; monitoring investigation of
05522.1A	COSMIC, SEATO, CENTO sub-registry control points; inspection of (U)
5530.9	Military security--civil censorship
5540.8D	Department of Defense industrial security program
5540.14	Transmission of classified information to cleared U.S. contractors outside the United States

SECNAV Instructions

P5212.5B	Disposal of Navy and Marine Corps records
5430.13B	Naval Intelligence investigative jurisdiction and responsibilities
5500.9A	Security review of Congressional testimony; procedures for
5510.13A	Security orientation, education and training program
05510.1E	Restricting of assignment and travel of personnel having vital information(U)

### OPNAV Instructions

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
5521.6A	Navy and Marine Corps military personnel security program
5570.2A	Policy governing the custody, use and preservation of Department of Defense official information which requires protection in the public interest
5730.8	Provision of information to the Congress
5741.2C	Relations with the General Accounting Office

### BUPERS Instructions

5510.3H	Security clearance requirements and procedures for Navy personnel scheduled to attend classified courses of instruction conducted by the Navy or other Armed Forces
5510.11A	Criteria and standards for personnel assigned to duties involving nuclear weapon and nuclear weapons systems
5521.2D	Security investigation and clearance of active-duty naval personnel; administrative requirements and procedures for

### Marine Corps Orders

5521.3C	Personnel security clearance and access.
5510.2C	Security of classified matter
5510.3A	Security of classified matter in ther-mofax duplication

### Miscellaneous

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
NCPI 732	Changes, removals, and other actions under the security program
ISM	Industrial security manual for safeguarding classified information

### Air Force Regulations

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
5-3	Air Force standard intelligence publications system.
5-4	Special weapons publications for non-U.S. NATO purposes
5-16	Issuing Air Force publications under grant aid provisions of the Military Assistance Program
5-30	USAF foreign clearance guide (FCG)
5-43	Preparation, procurement joint use of technical data and publications
6-1	Policies and procedures governing Air Force printing and duplicating
10-3	Exchange of information with the Department of State
11-5	Requests for USAF foreign operating rights and foreign military rights
11-12	Visits to Air Force installations and contractor facilities
11-30	Custody, use and preservation of DOD official information which requires protection in the public interest
20-4	The Air Force atomic energy program
35-62	Military personnel security program

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
40-12	Security program
40-23	Investigation for employment
40-202	Designation of civilian positions as sensitive
66-5	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS); administration and operation
66-6	Armed Forces Courier Service; general provisions
70-4	Air Force-National Aeronautics and Space Administration agreement
80-1	Air Force research and development
80-20	Concept formulation and contract definition of development projects
80-29	The Scientific and Technical Information Program.
124-4	Requests for investigating; safeguarding handling and release of information in OSI reports
181-3	Documentation storage and retrieval.
190-6	Air Force information program
190-12	Release of information to the public.
190-14	Air Force relations with industry
200-1	Air Force intelligence responsibilities and functions
200-24	Request for intelligence documents
205-1	Safeguarding classified information
205-2	Automatic, time-phased downgrading and declassification system
205-3	Security classification of infrared, visible and ultraviolet equipment, components and information
205-4	Industrial security
205-6	Personnel investigations, security clearances and access authorizations
205-7	Communications security
205-10	Security policy on the use of non-U.S. national employees

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
(C) 205-11	Security classification guide for laser (optical maser) information (U)
205-16	Security classification for proximity fuzes and components
(S) 205-17	Special security procedures, classification guide for sensitive controlled fragmentation munitions (U).
(O) 205-19	Controlling the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information produced by members of the intelligence community
205-21	Defensive security briefings
(C) 205-23	Special security procedures for military space programs and projects (U)
205-24	Classification management program.
205-26	Disclosure of information under the Military Assistance Program
205-27	Access to critical category atomic weapon stockpile and production information
205-29	Classification criteria and factors for scientific and technical information
(O) 205-34	Ultra sensitive position program.
(S) 205-36	Classification of IFF Mark XII System.
205-37	Security classification guides
205-49	Security classification of Air Force weapon systems, supporting systems, associated subsystems, miscellaneous aircraft and aircraft engines
205-53	Transmission protection for certain unclassified messages
205-57	Reporting and investigating espionage, sabotage and subversion
400-10	Procedures in support of the DOD Strategic Trade Control Program
400-37	Defense logistics studies information exchange



<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
AFP 205-2-1	Developing a methodology for security classification of scientific and technical material.
AFP 205-7-1	Transmission security

Atomic Energy Commission  
Laws and Regulations

42 USC 2011 et seq. 10 CFR Part 10	Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Criteria and procedures for determining eligibility for access to Restricted Data or defense information.
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AEC Manual -  
Chapter 2101

2105	Control of classified information
	Control of classified documents (general provisions)
2108	Weapon data
2109	Research and development reports
App. 2301	Personnel security handbook
2401	Physical security standards
3202	Reporting and dissemination of information resulting from research and development activities
3203	Servicing and control of scientific and technical information in report form
3204	Dissemination of unclassified published and unpublished AEC technical to foreign nations
App. 3401	Classification and declassification handbook

## National Aeronautics and Space Administration Laws and Regulations

<u>Statute</u>	<u>Title</u>
42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.	National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended
<u>Security Guidelines</u>	
NMI 1650.1	Industrial security policies and procedures.
NPD 1640.1	Security classification program.
NMI 1640.2	Group markings
<u>Reference</u>	
NHB 1640.4	NASA security classification program; criteria and guidelines

### Miscellaneous

Atomic Energy Commission. U.S. laws of general interest to security officers in AEC programs. August 1964.

Department of Commerce. Export control; 76th quarterly report, 2d quarter 1966, by the Secretary of Commerce to the President, the Senate, and The House of Representatives. August 15, 1966.

Department of Commerce. Bureau of International Commerce. A Summary of U.S. export control regulations. rev. March 1, 1965.

Government security and loyalty: a manual of laws regulations and procedures. 3 vols. Bureau of National Affairs, 1962 - .

U.S. Government organization manual, 1966-67. Office of the Federal Register (General Services Administration).

## **APPENDIX C**

### **FACILITIES SURVEYED AND PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

#### **Office, Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army**

Logan Cowgill

Roger Graves

#### **Army Materials Research Agency, Watertown Massachusetts**

Kathleen Carnes

Bernard Goldberg

#### **Defense Documentation Center**

Herbert Rehbock

#### **National Aeronautics and Space Administration**

Paul Demling

Van Wente

#### **Department of Defense, Directorate of Classification Management**

George MacClain

#### **Atomic Energy Commission**

Charles Gottschalk

Abraham Lebowitz

Charles Marshall

#### **British Embassy, Ministry of Defense**

Frank Bruce

#### **Research Analysis Corporation**

Mary Barrett

Margaret Emerson

Eugene Suto

#### **Lincoln Laboratory**

Joseph Ewers

E. C. Goulart

Mary Granese

Loyd Rathbun

**Natick Laboratories**

Robert Martin  
Robert McDonald  
Mary Young

**Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories**

John Armstrong  
Ole Gruse

**Defense Atomic Support Agency**

J. J. Asero  
C. M. Atkinson  
Sgt. R. Poirier

**Picatinny Arsenal**

Michael Costello  
Ismail Haznedari  
Henry Voos

**Army Map Service**

Frank Nicoletti

**Harry Diamond Laboratories**

John Rosenberg

**U. S. Army Missile Support Agency, White Sands**

Margrett Zenich

Unclassified

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13. ABSTRACT  A survey of the literature in the last ten years and inter-views with library and security personnel indicated: 1) the problems of handling classified information in libraries have been scantied; (2) there is wide divergence in policies and practices of disseminating such materials; (3, interlibrary cooperation with respect to classified holdings is reduced to minimum compliance with administrative or contractual obligations; (4) technical intelligence is perhaps artificially divorced from technical in-formation suitable for dissemination within the military - industrial community.  Following a critical analysis of survey findings, recom-mendations for action and further studies are presented.		

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Security Classification

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Security Classification

14	KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
		ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
	Security classification Classification management National defense Libraries Documentation Catalogs Indexes Abstracts Information Retrieval Selective Dissemination of Information (SDI) Bibliographies ATLIS Program						

Unclassified

Security Classification

W-2